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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
EVIDENCE OF UNCONNECTED CRIMES IN MUR-
DER TRIALS-In the recent case of Commonwealth v.
Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 143 At. 905, (1928), a new exception
to the general rule1 that evidence of unrelated crimes is not
admissible on the trial of a particular crime has been estab-
lished, applicable to a very limited class of cases. That is,
on a trial for first degree murder, evidence of other uncon-
nected crimes may be admitted, so that the jury might
thereby be aided in pronouncing sentence under the Act of
May 24, 1925, P. L. 759. 2
In the aforesaid case the defendant was on trial for
murder. During the course of the trial a confession of
other crimes was read along with the confession of the
particular killing. On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court in permitting the whole to be presented to
the jury.
The argument of the Supreme Court appears to be
substantially this. The Act of May 24, 1925, P. L. 759, in
cases of first degree murder, gives the jury the power and
imposes upon it the duty, after having found the guilt, to
inflict the sentence of life imprisonment or death as it
may see fit. Previously, the fixing of the punishment was
solely in the power of the court, and the privilege of hav-
ing the jury declare the punishment formed no part of the
common law. The purposes of this statute, and similar
statutes in other jurisdictions, was to diminish the reluct-
ance of juries to bring in a verdict of guilty of murder in
the first degree, to which the punishment of death auto-
matically attached. Because of this hesitancy, juries would
often bring in verdicts of a less degree of homicide, when
clearly the defendant was guilty of first degree murder.
The act of 1925 was passed to give the jury the power to
name the penalty and discretion as to what it should be,
so that an opportunity might be given for the exercise of
'For general rule see Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 1, Sec.
Ed., Par. 193; Com. v. Jones, 280 Pa. 368 (1924); Com. v. Wilson, 186
Pa. 1 (1898); Goersen v. Com., 99 Pa. 388 (1882).
2
"Every person convicted of the crime of murder of the first de-
gree ... shall be sentenced to suffer death ... in the manner provided
by law, or to undergo imprisonment for life, at the discretion of the
jury trying the case which shall fix the penalty by its verdict." Act
of May 24, 1925, P. L. 759.
The rule has been reiterated in Com. v. Mellor (Nov. 26, 1928)
144 At. 534, 294 Pa-.
827 Harvard L~w Review 169; Pcople v. Welch, 49 Cal. 174 (1874).
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mercy, in cases where the jury thought it should be grant-
ed, with a corresponding decrease in the jury's reluctance
to find a verdict of first degree murder. In Pennsylvania
there is no procedure4 whereby a jury can determine the
guilt, and then hear other evidenc to guide them as to
punishment. The jury must find the fact of guilt and set
the punishment in the same verdict, 5 so that, because of the
discretion vested in the jury, there must be a more liberal
rule of evidence to aid them in determining the punishment.
Therefore, evidence of independent, unconnected crimes is
admissible to guide the jury in assessing the penalty.6
It is obvious that the result of such evidence will be to
influence the death sentence. The Supreme Court admits
that evidence of other crimes is very likely to influence the
jury on the -determination of guilt. Such hardship, it says,
is one the defendant must bear. And this significant state-
ment is added: "The Act of 1925 was not passed to help
habitual crimals and we take judicial knowledge of the
fact that offenders of this designation have become so gen-
eral that the law, not only lex scripta, but non scripta, must
'Panek v. Scranton Ry. Co. 258 Pa. 589 (1917).
BCom. v. Curry, 287 Pa. 553 (1926).
OUnder Pennsylvania habitual criminal statutes (Acts of April
22, 1794, sec. 13, 2 Sm. L. 190; Mar. 31, 1860, sec. 182, P. L. 426; May
10, 1909, See. 6, P. L. 496) providing for severer penalties for second
or third offenders to be imposed by the court, prior convictions
must be averred in indictment and proved on trial. Com. v. Curry,
285 Pa. 289 (1926); Com. v. McKenty, 80 Pa. Super. 249 (1922);
Halderman's Case, 53 Pa. Super. 554 (1913); Com. v. Payne, 242 Pa.
394 (1913); Kane v. Com., 109 Pa. 541 (1885); Rauch v. Com., 78 Pa.
490 (1875); Smith v. Com., 14 S. & R. 69 (1826).
Where jury is permitted to fix penalties for second offenders
under habitual criminal statutes, evidence of prior convictions is ad-
missible. State v. Bailey, 115 S. 613 (La. 1927); State v. O'Neill, 248
Pac. 215 (Mon. 1926); Hall v. Com. 51 S. W. 814 (Ky. 1899). In
New York under habitual criminal statute former offenses were re-
garded as ingredient element of the aggravated offense so that evi-
dence of former offenses was admissable on this ground, People v.
Sickles, 51 N. E. 288 (N. Y. 1898). This has been changed by statute
in New York so that now inquiry into fact of former conviction can
be made by jury only after conviction, People v. Gowasky, 155 N. E.
737 (N. Y. 1927). Also State v. Ferrone, 113 At. 452 (Conn. 1921);
Ross Case, 2 Pickering 165 (Mass. 1824). In England there is a like
procedure, 8 Edw. 7, c. 59, Par. 10, in Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 1,
Sec. Ed., Par. 196, note 1.
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advance to protect society against them."
It appears that there is only one other decision on this
point7 and it is contra to the rule enunciated in Com. v.
Parker. In People v. Witt, 170 Cal. 104, 148 Pac. 928 (1922),
the prisoner was tried for murder in the first degree. On
trial, evidence, otherwise irrelevant as to previous habits,
as to his parents and other extenuating circumstances, was
sought to be introduced, for the purpose of guiding the jury
in determining the punishment. The evidence was exclud-
ed and the appellate court, upholding the exclusion, said:
"We are of the opinion that our law does not contemplate
any such independent inquiry on a trial for murder, and
that the determination of the jury-as to death or life im-
prisonment is nece;sarily to be based solely on such evid-
ence as is admissible in the usual mode by the indictment
or information and the plea of the defendant." This de-
cision was recognized in Commonwealth v. Parker as be-
ing contra to the rule therein announced by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, but the new principle was formulated
notwithstanding.
The problem now presents itself as to how far the rule
will extend. Clearly, evidence of other, independent crimes
is highly prejudicial to the defendant; and, unless the rule
is properly limited, great injustice might result to him
through the operation of the rule. Some light on this point
is shed by the Court itself; for, judging from the opinion,
it seems that such evidence would be admissible only, if, in
the mind of the trial court, the defendant is an habitual
criminal, that crime was the general manner of his life,
that he was a menace to society.8 Consequently, it would
appear, if the defendant, in the opinion of the trial court,
were not an habitual criminal and a menace to society, be-
cause of his manner of life, but had committed other crimes
7in State v. Tranmer, 154 Pac. 80 (Nev. 1915), it was held that in
a trial for murder, where a joint principal in the crime with the ac-
cused who had been previously convicted and sentenced to death had
been called as a witness for the state, it was reversible error to allow
the state, for the purpose of influencing the jury to inflict the death
penalty on accused, to ask the witness if he was in the state's prison
under a sentence of death.
In People v. Hall, 249 Pac. 859 (Cal. 1926), evidence in murder
case of escape of defendant from prison was held admissible as bear-
ing on the question of punishment.
sSee Com. v. Mellor, supra.
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of less serious nature and at a remote period, evidence of
the other offenses could not be properly introduced.
Looking at the matter from a different angle, would it
not be possible, by virtue of this rule, to introduce evid-
ence, which otherwise would not be admissible, of extenuat-
ing conditions and circumstances, as was attempted in
People v. Witt, supra, in order that the jury might be in-
duced to leniency and inflict the lighter penalty? The reason
would be just as persuasive in the one case as in the other,
for in both situations the evidence would act as a beacon
to guide the jury in the decision as to punishment.
Certainly the rule is a radical departure from the form-
er stand of the courts. Every reason that has been advanc-
ed to justify the general rule excluding evidence of unre-
lated crimes is applicable to the exception. The evidence
tends to prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury;
it may be the deciding factor in determining the guilt; the
prisoner is faced with charges he is unprepared to meet.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court has considered the
value of such evidence in helping the jury to assess the pen-
alty to outweigh the disadvantages caused to the defend-
ant, and this with full knowledge of the burden thereby
placed upon the defendant.
What justification is there then for the departure?
The answer seems to be found in the words of the court
that "not only the lex scripta, but non scripta, must ad-
vance to protect society against them." In other words
conditions of crime have become so prevalent that they
have become a source of great menace to present day soc-
iety. The written law, the criminal code, has not been ad-
vanced fast enough to meet these new conditions, so that
the courts by unwritten law must, as best they can, make
up the deficiency. If there is no legal justification, yet
there is at least a social justification in making the way
hard for the habitual criminal in the interests of and in the
protection of the lives and property of the people.
-It would be much fairer to the prisoner, if the legis-
lature would enact a statute permitting the jury, having de-
cided on the guilt, to then hear evidence for the determina-
tion of the punishment. But there being no statute the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has seen fit to adopt a
course of "no quarter" against the hardened criminal, even
though at the expense of a settled principle of evidence.
As has been hinted before, it can only be justified in the
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
urgent need to suppress the habitual criminals who are so
rampant today.9
RUSSELL S. MACHMER.
EQUITY DELIGHTS TO DO JUSTICE AND NOT
BY HALVES-This maxim, although not often quoted in
the opinions of the courts is, nevertheless, one of the most
important of the maxims of equity. The significance of the
maxim lies in its last words. It means that it iS the aim of
equity to have all interested parties in court and to render
a complete decree, adjusting all rights and protecting the
parties against future litigation. The principle of the
maxim embraces the well-established doctrine that when
equity once acquires jurisdiction it will retain it so as to
afford complete relief." The maxim does not always ap-
pear in exactly the above words,2 but the rules applicable
are the same,
Professor Bisphan in his book "Principles of Equity"
does not recognize the maxim as a distinct one, but rather
OSee 42 Harvard Law Review 832 for brief criticism.
121 Corpus Juris p. 198, Par. 187; Piro v. Shipley, 33 Pa. Super.
278 (1907).
2This maxim does not appear in Francis, in Pomeroy, nor in
Story Eq. Jur., but is given in Story Ed. Pl. Sec. 72. The other
statements of the rule are: 1-"Equity does nothing by halves." Lat-
imer v. Irish-American Bank, 119 Ga. 887, 47 S. E. 322, (1904). 2-"It
is characteristic of equity to do justice, and not by halves." Beville
v. Boyd, 16 Tex. Civ. A. 491, 42 S. W. 318, (1897). 3-"A court of
equity ought to do justice completely, and not by halves." Camp v.
Boyd, 229 U. S. 530, (1912). 4-"Equity does nothing grudgingly or by
halves. Its outstretched arm corrects but with loving kindness with-
aL" Stitt v. Stitt, 205 Mo. 155, 103 S. W. 547 (1907). 5-"When equity
lays hold of a subject-matter it does not lift its hand until plenary
and perfect justice is done as near as may be under the issues!.
Jelly v. Lamar, 242 Mo. 44, 145 S. W. 799, (1912). 6.-"It is the de-
sire as well as the duty of this court never to do justice by the halves,
-never merely to beget business for another court,--and never, when
a case is fairly within its jurisdiction to leave open the door for liti-
gation farther or in any other place, if It can possibly be here closed."
Decker v. Caskey, I N. J. Eq. 427. 7-"Equity will not permit litiga-
tion by piecemeal, but will determine the whole controversy where
all the facts and parties are before it." Curtin v. Krohn, 4 Cal, A.
131, 87 Pac. 243, (1906).
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